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6DEDKDQG6DUDZDNLQWKHWK*HQHUDO
(OHFWLRQ*(/RFDO)DFWRUVDQG
6WDWH1DWLRQDOLVP
-DPHV&KLQ
Abstract: Many would argue that the main factors in Pakatan Harapan’s 
victory were the 1MDB scandal, anti-Najib and anti-UMNO sentiments, 
and Mahathir’s ability to penetrate the rural Malay constituencies so as to 
split the UMNO/PAS vote. In the East Malaysia states of Sabah and Sa-
rawak, however, it was local factors and state nationalism that largely de-
cided the outcome of GE14. In this article, I will argue that the rise of 
state nationalism means that the most potent political issue in contempo-
rary East Malaysia is MA63 – or the 1963 Malaysia Agreement. MA63 
gives Sabah and Sarawak autonomy in a wide range of areas. For the past 
half-century, the East Malaysia polity has felt that it has lost its autonomy 
in many areas stipulated in the MA63 agreement, due to the centralisation 
of bureaucratic powers by the federal government. This has created a 
strong sense of historical grievance among Sabahans and Sarawakians, es-
pecially the non-Muslim native communities. The MA63 issue combined 
with local factors such as the selection of candidates and internal party 
disputes as well as sabotage together better reflect the on-the-ground ex-
perience of GE14 in Sabah and Sarawak. 
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,QWURGXFWLRQ
In this article I will explain the reasons why GE14’s results in Sabah and 
Sarawak were largely decided by local factors, not national ones. Although 
the general mood was against Barisan Nasional (BN), and Najib Razak in 
particular, it was local factors that decided most of the seats in the Borneo 
states. The unhappiness over the 1963 Malaysia Agreement (MA63) and 
the calls for state nationalism were the key features of the prevailing polit-
ical mood in both states. While Sabah held both parliamentary and state 
elections, in Sarawak only parliamentary ones were held. Sarawak holds 
separate state elections, the most recent ones in 2016.
The end result of this discontent was that, for the first time in living 
memory, both the Borneo states would be ruled by a different party from 
the one that controls the federal government, the Pakatan Harapan (PH) 
alliance. Sarawak is now under the Gabugan Parti Sarawak (GPS), while 
Sabah is governed by a Parti Warisan Sabah–Pakatan Harapan (PWS–PH) 
alliance government. 
7KH0DOD\VLD$JUHHPHQW&RQWURYHUV\
The starting point for understanding contemporary politics in the Borneo 
states is MA63, the agreement that created the Federation of Malaysia. It 
was signed by the United Kingdom, Malaya, Singapore, North Borneo, 
and Sarawak. There is no space here to discuss MA63 in detail, other than 
to appreciate that it grants the states of North Borneo (as Sabah was then 
called) and Sarawak a high degree of autonomy within the proposed fed-
eration. The origins of this autonomy lie in what is called the “Twenty 
Points” – a set of 20 demands made by the political leaders of North Bor-
neo and Sarawak in return for agreeing to form the Malaysian federation 
(Cobbold Report, see Great Britain 1962). These were essentially political 
guarantees for a very high degree of autonomy within a federal system.
Sabah and Sarawak leaders felt, both then and now, that they would 
be “taken over” by those in the peninsula if they did not retain a high 
degree of autonomy. So they asked for autonomy in areas like language 
(English would remain the official language), religion (Islam was not to be 
the official religion), immigration (they could deny entry to Malaysians 
coming from outside the state), “Borneonisation” (only locals to fill senior 
civil service posts), tariffs and finance, education, as well as regarding con-
trol of their natural resources (Chin 2014, 2015; Puyok 2016).
Save for its powers over immigration, all these supposedly autono-
mous matters were effectively taken over by the federal government via 
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bureaucratic regulations over the years that followed – that with minimal 
consultation with Kuching and Kota Kinabalu. I argue that this marginal-
isation has resulted in the underdevelopment of Sabah and Sarawak com-
pared to those states in the peninsula. State nationalists like to point out 
that many parts of the interior in Sabah and Sarawak do not even have 
access to electricity or running water.
The political ideologies of Ketuanan Melayu (Malay supremacy) and 
ketuanan Islam (Islamic supremacy), both strongly maintained by the ruling 
United Malays National Organisation (UMNO) party, are controversial in 
Sabah and Sarawak (Chin 2015a). The main indigenous peoples in Sabah 
– the Kadazandusun Murut (KDM) – and in Sarawak – the Dayaks – are 
largely non-Muslim. More importantly, the ethnic Malays in both states do 
not see the Malayan ethnic Malays as their brethren – while the version of 
Islam practiced in both states is far more tolerant. This is largely due to 
the population structure. Both states are very pluralistic, with no single 
ethnic group making up more than 40 per cent of the state population – 
unlike Malaya, where the Malays/Muslims constitute more than half of the 
people living there. In Sarawak, 40 per cent of the population is Christian 
while Islam is not recognised as the official religion in the state. Hence, 
the standard joke among the KDM and Dayak is that they are “second 
class bumiputera” when compared to the ethnic Malays. They claimed also 
they did not really benefit from the extensive affirmative action policies of 
the New Economic Policy (NEP) adopted first from 1971 (Chin 2017).
6DEDK
In the decade preceding GE14, politics in Sabah was dominated by Musa 
Aman, Sabah UMNO’s powerful chief minister. Musa comes from one of 
Sabah’s most prominent political families while his brother, Anifah Aman, 
was Malaysia’s foreign minister. Through a combination of wealth and 
ruthless political manoeuvres, he cemented Sabah UMNO’s position by 
increasing the number of seats held by Sabah UMNO and the Muslim 
community – ensuring that Muslim-majority constituencies formed about 
half of all those in the state. UMNO was not only seen as a power unto 
itself but Musa Aman was himself very much seen as Sabah UMNO’s 
strongman (Chin and Puyok 2010). 
The watershed moment came in 2016, when Shafie Apdal – UMNO’s 
vice president and Musa’s rival – was sacked from the federal cabinet when 
he questioned Prime Minister Najib Razak over the 1MDB scandal. Najib, 
who was directly implicated in this scandal, took it as a direct challenge 
and so removed Shafie (along with several other key ministers, including 
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the deputy prime minister Muhyiddin Yassin). The sacking caused a com-
motion inside Sabah UMNO, as Shafie was the most senior Sabahan 
within the UMNO hierarchy. At this point, Shafie only really had two op-
tions: he could, first, either join one of the Sabah PH parties or enrol in 
one of the other existing Sabah-based opposition ones; in fact, Shafie was 
approached by the People’s Justice Party (PKR) to join them. The second 
option was to form a new political party.1 
Shafie did not want to join PKR or any of the other PH parties, be-
cause he wished to stand on a Sabah nationalism platform and to be a 
Sabah nationalist; joining PH would simply mean that he would subse-
quently be accused of supporting Malayans. Nor did he want to join any 
of the existing Sabah-based opposition parties either, as none of them 
could show that they had state-wide support. In fact, many of these parties 
were dominated by a single personality and their support bases were very 
narrowly defined. What Shafie wanted was to create a political party that 
would gain support from all the three major political groups in Sabah: 
namely, the Muslims, the non-Muslim bumiputeras (NMB), and the Chinese. 
Prior to his sacking, Shafie had held discussions with Darrel Leiking, the 
PKR member of parliament from Penampang. Leiking, who comes from 
a political family, was widely seen as representing a new generation of 
KDM leader, one who could acquire the support of the younger NMB 
community – who were disillusioned by Sabah UMNO’s total dominance. 
In addition, Leiking was popular with the youth of the Chinese community 
too.  
The strategy was remarkably simple. Shafie was to attract the Muslim 
vote – primarily from Sabah’s east coast – while Leiking was to capture 
the NMB vote – primarily from the KDM. Both men did not really worry 
about the Chinese vote, as they knew that the sentiment among the urban 
Chinese was unanimously anti-BN. They also managed to convince a 
young Democratic Action Party (DAP) state assemblyman, Junz Wong, to 
join them. Wong was supposed to reach out to the Chinese community. 
In early 2016, Shafie began secret negotiations to take over Parti Pem-
bangunan Warisan Sabah, a dormant political party, and by September he 
was the party leader. The rationale was simple. The registrar of societies 
(RoS), controlled by UMNO, was likely to reject his bid to form a new 
political party – or, at the very least, delay the approval thereof. There were 
many cases of RoS delaying the registration of new parties if they were 
seen to be seriously challenging the BN’s political base. In October 2016, 

1  The following section on the formation of PWS is largely based on interviews 
with senior leaders of that party. 
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RoS approved a name change to Parti Warisan Sabah (PWS). Leiking be-
came the deputy president. The vice presidents were Jaujan Sambakong 
(Sabah UMNO, Sulabayan assemblyman), Junz Wong (DAP, Likas assem-
blyman), and Organisation of KDM Malaysia president, Peter Anthony. 
Thus, from the moment of its founding, PWS had all the major ethnic 
groups (KDM, Muslims, Chinese) represented at the leadership level.  
Many Sabahans saw PWS as the agent of change, similar to the way 
they had seen Parti Bersatu Sabah (PBS) back in 1985. The similarities are 
striking, indeed. PBS was established by Joseph Pairin Kitingan after he 
was sacked as a minister in the Berjaya state government. Like Apdal later, 
Pairin was sacked because he challenged the authority of the then chief 
minister, Harris Salleh. In the 1985 and 1986 state elections, Sabahans 
backed PBS and removed Berjaya from government (Kahin 1992; Puthu-
cheary 1985).  
7KH&DPSDLJQ
Even prior to the formal campaign period, PWS had the political momen-
tum – with many of its rallies attracting thousands of people (Daily Express 
2016). It was obvious that PWS’s Sabah platform was well received by the 
population, especially the Chinese and NMB. PWS’s strategy was simple. 
Shafie’s support was strong on the east coast, especially among the Suluk 
and Bajaus, while Leiking’s powerbase was among the KDM and Chinese 
on the west coast. The calculation was that if they could attain about half 
the possible support from KDM and Muslims, then they would be able to 
win. The Chinese vote was not a problem; it was understood that it was 
always going to solidly be for the opposition. The underlying message was 
Sabah nationalism, as in getting rid of Sabah UMNO – a symbol of the 
federal government.2  
Initially PWS wanted all the opposition parties to come together un-
der a loose alliance so as to coherently challenge Sabah BN. This was not 
possible due primarily to personality conflicts. In the end, PWS decided 
that the best option was an alliance with only PH Sabah. Joining PH was 
seen as a political liability, since PWS was claiming to be fighting for MA63 
and one of its key demands was a return of 40 per cent of all Sabah taxes 
collected by the federal government. Under MA63, indeed, Sabah was sup-
posed to be given this percentage. 
The smaller opposition parties came together in Gabugan Sabah 
(United Sabah Alliance), essentially a coalition of parties that stood solely 

2  Interview with a senior PWS leader in July 2018. 
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on the platform of Sabah nationalism. Their manifesto had the strongest 
backing on Sabah’s rights under MA63. Essentially they were arguing that 
Sabah should quit the federation until such time the federal government 
gave Sabah complete autonomy within the Malaysian state, as originally 
promised under the terms of MA63.  
Many Sabah nationalists were torn between the PWS–Sabah PH and 
the GPS; in the end, however, they decided to back the PWS–Sabah PH 
alliance as it was seen as having a real chance to dislodge Sabah UMNO 
from power. The momentum to this end was especially strong in the Chi-
nese and NMB areas. Defectors from Sabah BN were particularly effective 
in turning the electorate against Sabah BN, as they had credibility when 
they campaigned against their former parties. These defectors were able 
to give precise examples of how Sabah UMNO was involved in corrupt 
practices and how Sabah BN had marginalised the non-Muslim commu-
nity and sold out Sabah’s best interests to UMNO.3  
PBS, the key NMB party within the Sabah BN, suffered from leader-
ship fatigue. Many younger KDM voters were unhappy that Sabah 
UMNO was marginalising the KDM community and blamed KDM lead-
ers such as Pairin for not standing up to that party. The bulk of KDM 
voters were Christians, and they were increasingly uncomfortable with the 
Islamisation programme pushed by the federal UMNO. They felt that the 
KDM BN parties did not sufficiently push back against the Islamisation 
programme in Sabah. They were most disappointed that PBS had been led 
by the same personalities since its inception in 1985. Prior to GE14, Pairin 
Kitingan had promised to step down and hand power over to a new gen-
eration of leaders. But this did not happen, and when it was announced 
that he would stand again for both parliamentary and state seats this sent 
a strong, negative signal to KDM voters. In addition, Dr. Maximus Ongkili 
– the man Pairin had identified as his successor – did not signify a genuine 
political change since he was from Pairin’s own generation. Ongkili was 
one of PBS’s pioneer members. Younger KDM voters wanted a much 
younger person to take over as PBS leader, and thus grew increasingly 
frustrated with the old guard.  
The problem of leadership renewal was also present in the other two 
BN KDM parties, United Pasokmomogun Kadazandusun Murut Organ-
isation (UPKO) and Parti Bersatu Rakyat Sabah (PBRS). Both these par-
ties started off as splinter ones from PBS in 1994, thus they faced the same 
problem as it had done – being seen by the younger KDM voters as “old 
and tired,” as well as too subservient to Sabah UMNO and Musa Aman, 

3  Interviews with several PH campaigners in July 2018. 
  Sabah and Sarawak in the 14th General Election 2018 179 

the rich and powerful Sabah UMNO leader who, as noted, was also the 
chief minister. PBRS was especially seen as old and tired when its leader, 
Joseph Kurup, eventually handed over his seat to his son, Arthur Kurup. 
In general, many KDM voters had negative views of their parties 
within the Sabah BN. They were also angry that the illegals issue was still 
not resolved despite a RCI report,4 and saw Sabah UMNO as being too 
close to the national branch thereof – and therefore as neglecting Sabah’s 
rights under MA63. Actually the PWS–PH alliance benefited from the 
Gabugan Sabah’s nationalistic “Sabah Rights” campaign. Many Sabahans, 
especially those in urban areas who believed in Sabah nationalism, voted 
for the PWS–PH alliance because they knew only it had a realistic chance 
to replace the Sabah BN government. 
Musa and Sabah UMNO were also suffering from hubris and over-
confidence.5 Sabah UMNO thought that vote-buying – used successfully 
in previous elections – would work equally well this time around too. What 
they did not realised was that the voters were becoming weary of Musa 
Aman and Sabah UMNO. As mentioned earlier, Sabah UMNO members 
who defected to the opposition were very effective in recounting to voters 
the high level of corruption within Sabah UMNO – in particular, among 
the close associates of Musa Aman. Musa himself was implicated by pay-
offs related to the timber industry.6 Musa did not help himself when he 
nominated five members of his family to be candidates, including his 
brother and son.7  

4  More than one-third of Sabah’s population are illegal migrants, mostly Muslims 
from the southern Philippines and Indonesia. They were given Malaysian citi-
zenship during “Project M” (M for Mahathir), in order to ensure Muslin domi-
nance in elections and politics. A 2014 Royal Commission of Inquiry (RCI) 
found evidence that the federal UMNO was involved. Many NMB and KDM 
voters blamed the KDM parties in Sabah BN for not doing anything about these 
illegals. For a summary of the RCI findings, see Frank (2006). 
5  In an interview with a Sabah UMNO minister prior to the election, he was very 
confident that the Muslim seats would be retained. 
6  The corruption allegations against Musa Aman were first published on the whis-
tleblowing website Sarawak Report. It was alleged that he had received millions 
of dollars into an overseas account in return for granting timber concessions. 
The allegations turned out to have some merit to them, when in November 2018 
he was formally charged with corruption. See The Star (2018a). The original alle-
gations, published in 2012, can be found online at: <www.sarawakreport.org 
/2012/04/hold-on-trust-for-aman-more-devastating-evidence-from-the-icac-in 
vestigation/> (29 November 2018). 
7  Both went on to win their respective seats. While it is not uncommon in Sabah 
for political families such as the Amans to have more than one candidate, having 
five is nonetheless unusually high.  
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Prior to the election, it was expected that the contest would be a close one 
– and that the deciding votes would be from the Muslim constituencies. 
The KDM and Chinese were widely expected to vote for the PWS–PH 
alliance. The only question mark was over the Muslim constituencies, as 
previously they had been susceptible to vote-buying.8 In the end, almost 
all the young people from the KDM, Muslim, and Chinese communities 
backed the PWS–PH alliance. Their message of change, the corruption 
allegations against leaders such as Najib and Musa, and pent-up frustra-
tions over MA63 and illegals – harboured against Sabah BN and Sabah 
UMNO in particular – all combined to create a tidal wave of opposition. 
Sabahans wanted “independence” from UMNO, the symbol of federal 
political oppression. As mentioned earlier, unlike in other Malaysian fed-
eral states, change of government in Sabah is not a new thing – and the 
voters simply reverted back to the old pattern.  
At the parliamentary level, PWS–PH managed to win 14 of the 25 
available seats – while Sabah BN only won 10. The last seat went to the 
Solidariti Tanah Airku Rakyat Sabah (STAR–GS), part of Gabugan Sabah 
(GS), the party with the strongest MA63 message. At the state level, results 
were deadlocked. Both PWS–PH and Sabah BN won 29 seats each, with 
the final two going to STAR–GS. 
The strongest anti-BN vote came from the Chinese community. 
These individuals essentially voted as a single bloc against Sabah BN, caus-
ing the collapse of all the key Chinese-based Sabah BN parties, the Liberal 
Democratic Party (LDP), and the Malaysian Chinese Association (MCA). 
The only minor party that did well was STAR-GS, the champions of 
MA63. Part of the reason why STAR was able to win was due to the per-
sonality of its leader, Jeffrey Gapari Kitingan. Jaffrey is probably the most 
well-known state nationalist and MA63 champion in Sabah, having drawn 
on this issue for almost the entirety of his political career. He is also the 
younger brother of Joseph Pairin Kitingan, president of BN–PBS. They 
have a political feud going back decades, with Jeffrey regularly challenging 
– and losing to – his brother in previous elections. In the 2018 election, 
however, Jeffrey managed to defeat Pairin for the Tambunan state seat. 
This is highly significant given that Pairin is Huguan Siou, or paramount 
leader of the KDM community. Prior to his defeat, Pairin had represented 
the Tambunan constituency for some 42 years. This defeat clearly symbol-
ised that the younger voters rejected old KDM leaders such as Pairin who, 

8  For examples, see the following pre-GE14 analysis: Promchertchoo (2018); 
Welsh (2018); Chin (2018b).  
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as mentioned previously, was seen as too subservient to Sabah UMNO, 
old and tired, and not really fighting for Sabah’s interests – as well as too 
comfortable, as a result of being part of the ruling elite.9  
7DEOH5HVXOWVRI6DEDK3DUOLDPHQWDU\(OHFWLRQ
Government Won Total 
Sabah UMNO 7  
PBS 1  
UPKO 1  
PBRS 1  
 Sabah BN Total 10 
Opposition   
Parti Warisan Sabah 8  
PH–DAP 3  
PH–PKR 3  
 PWS–PH alliance 14 
Solidariti Tanah Airku Rakyat Sabah (STAR) 1  
 Gabungan Sabah 1 
 Total 25 
6RXUFH 0DOD\VLDQ(OHFWLRQ&RPPLVVLRQZHEVLWHQG
7DEOH5HVXOWVRIWKH6DEDK6WDWH(OHFWLRQ
Govt- Sabah BN Won Total 
Sabah UMNO 17  
PBS 6  
UPKO 5  
PBRS 1  
 Sabah BN Total 29 
Opposition   
Parti Warisan Sabah 21  
PH–DAP 6  
PH–PKR 2  
 PWS–PH alliance 29 
Solidariti Tanah Airku Rakyat Sabah (STAR) 2  
 Gabungan Sabah 2 
 Total 60 
6RXUFH 0DOD\VLDQ(OHFWLRQ&RPPLVVLRQZHEVLWHQG

9  Malaysiakini (2018a). In my many interviews with younger members of the PBS, 
they openly criticise their leader Pairin – many expressing the sentiment that he 
should have retired years ago and given way to a younger generation of leaders. 
They also felt that the old leaders were hanging on to their positions, thus deny-
ing the next generation the chance to move up. 
  182 James Chin 

6DUDZDN
Prior to the election, the general consensus was that only the urban Chi-
nese seats were competitive while the Muslim and Dayak ones were secure. 
The three most important political events prior to the election were: Taib 
Mahmud’s elevation to state governor; the short tenure of Adenan Satem; 
and, the 2016 state elections. All three are related. 
Taib Mahmud is Sarawak’s longest-serving chief minister. He ruled 
from 1981 until 2014, when he stepped up to the post of Governor – 
supposedly only a non-political, ceremonial one. His 33-year rule was 
marked by strong allegations of corruption that made his family one of the 
wealthiest in the region, siphoning off a minimum of USD 15 billion from 
corrupt deals in Sarawak (Straumann 2014). During the latter part of his 
rule, he was the number one issue in Sarawak elections – with widespread 
calls for the federal government to investigate the corruption allegations 
against him. He was such a strongman that he was not only able to engi-
neer his own nomination as state governor, but also to handpick Adenan 
Satem – his ex-brother-in-law – as his successor as chief minister (Chin 
2015b).  
Adenan started off with a lot of goodwill, as all strata of Sarawak 
society were tired of Taib Mahmud and weary of the corruption allegations. 
In order to obtain a personal mandate, Adenan called for a state election 
on 7 May 2016. Adenan cleverly deflected the corruption issue surround-
ing Taib Mahmud by concentrating instead on Sarawak nationalism, claim-
ing that under his administration getting back the “rights” stipulated under 
MA63 was the number one priority (Mohamed and Rashaad 2017; Hah 
2018). This was hugely popular among the population, including sections 
of the normally anti-establishment Chinese voting bloc. Under Adenan, 
Sarawak BN won an unprecedented 72 out of the 82 possible seats in the 
State Assembly, a success rate of 87 per cent. He won all the Muslim-
majority constituencies and more than 90 per cent of the Dayak seats. The 
only community he was not able to dominate was the Chinese one, which 
split its vote between the Sarawak DAP and the SUPP – the local-based 
Chinese party. Unfortunately for Sarawak BN, Adenan died of heart fail-
ure in January 2017, after serving as chief minister for less than three years 
– and less than 12 months after the May 2016 state polls. Abang Johari 
Tun Openg, hailing from a prominent Malay family, took over as chief 
minister. 
 
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When the 2018 general election date was announced, Sarawak BN was 
confident that – based on the 2016 results – only the Chinese-majority 
seats were at risk. The Muslim-majority and Dayak-majority seats were 
considered safe. After all, it was a parliamentary election, and the assump-
tion was that voters would not take it as seriously as a state one. The Sa-
rawak BN used essentially the same message for the 2018 election: state 
nationalism. Sarawak could only be ruled by Sarawak-based parties, and 
local voters should be suspicious of “Malayan parties” such as PH – as 
they would not be MA63 or state champions. This simple message had 
worked incredibly well in the 2016 state election, and there was no indica-
tion that it would no work in the 2018 parliamentary one too. Moreover, 
like in Sabah, extensive vote-buying by the ruling BN has always been a 
key feature of all previous Sarawak elections – a practice that Sarawak BN 
was notorious for indulging in over many decades (Chin 1997a; Aeria 
2005).  
Sarawak BN became even more confident when reports emerged that 
there were differences between Sarawak DAP and PKR over seat alloca-
tion. It was well known that Sarawak DAP saw all Chinese-majority con-
stituencies as its “rice bowl.” In the 2013 general election, due to internal 
squabbling, DAP was forced to give up Miri constituency to PKR. Dr. 
Michael Teo, a PKR Chinese candidate, won the seat – but he was known 
to be uninterested in being an MP and did not attend parliament regularly. 
Dr. Teo was instead trying to put forward his own candidate, Bill Kayong, 
to replace him for the 2018 pools. Before any announcement could be 
made, Kayong was assassinated in a case related to native titles (The Straits 
Times 2016). Without a clear candidate to replace Dr. Teo, there were wide-
spread rumours that DAP would swap the Miri seat with PKR. This plan, 
however, was never implemented when federal PH leaders decided that 
all the PH component parties would contest seats in the same constituen-
cies as they had done in the 2013 general election. Fresh on their mind 
was the bickering between DAP and PKR in the 2016 state elections, 
which probably caused DAP to lose at least one or more seat.10 With Dr. 
Teo eventually renominated for the Miri seat, SUPP was confident that it 
had a chance to win. 
 

10  Interviews with DAP and PKR leaders. 
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The results came as a massive shock to Sarawak BN. The opposition won 
12 out of 31 seats. While losing all the Chinese-majority constituencies had 
always been a possibility, they never thought that they would lose Dayak-
majority ones. Yet six Dayak-majority seats fell to the opposition.  
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Govt- Sarawak BN Won Total 
PBB 10  
PRS 3  
SUPP 1  
PDP 2  
 Sarawak BN Total 19 
Opposition   
PH–DAP 6  
PH–PKR 4  
 PH coalition 10 
Independents 2 2 
 Total 31 
6RXUFH 0DOD\VLDQ(OHFWLRQ&RPPLVVLRQZHEVLWHQG
1RWH 7KHWZRLQGHSHQGHQWVMRLQHG3.5DIWHUWKHHOHFWLRQHIIHFWLYHO\JLYLQJ3.5VL[
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The big surprise in Sarawak was the loss of all seven of the Chinese-ma-
jority constituencies (Bandar Kuching, Bandar Miri, Bandar Sibu, Stampin, 
Lanang, and Sarikei) to the PH. SUPP was confident that it could win at 
least one of the Chinese seats – either Bandar Miri or Stampin.11 An even 
bigger surprise was the loss of six Dayak-majority seats (Selangau, Saratok, 
Julau, Lubok Antu, Puncak Borneo, Mas Gading) to PKR and independ-
ents.  
DAP seized five (Bandar Kuching, Stampin, Bandar Sibu, Lanang, 
and Sarikei) of the six Chinese seats, while Bandar Miri fell to PKR’s Dr. 
Michael Teo. Although SUPP ran a strong Sarawak rights campaign and 
was expected to give real competition for Stampin and Bandar Miri, the 
mood of the Sarawak Chinese was simply too anti-Najib and anti-UMNO 
for them to win. Like most of the Chinese community elsewhere, these 
individuals wanted above all to get rid of “kleptocratic” Najib and “racist” 
UMNO from power (Chin 2018a).  
There were other local factors at work, too. First, many Chinese vot-
ers felt SUPP’s campaign was disingenuous. Dr. Sim Kui Hian, SUPP 

11  Interviews with several SUPP leaders in February 2018. 
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president, kept repeating that a strong SUPP and Sarawak BN was re-
quired for Sarawak to regain MA63’s autonomy. SUPP’s campaign slogan 
was “I’m in for a stronger Sarawak,” but Chinese voters did not buy the 
argument for the simple reason that SUPP was already part of the ruling 
BN – both at the federal and state level. If SUPP and Sarawak BN were 
not able to deliver MA63’s autonomy as part of the BN, additional seats 
would not matter. In addition, Chinese voter felt insulted that SUPP had 
tried to distance itself from Najib and the 1MDB corruption scandal. Dr. 
Sim claimed that Sarawak BN dares to say “No to UMNO” (The Borneo 
Post 2018a), being reinforced by Chief Minister Abang Johari’s statement 
that SUPP is not a puppet of UMNO (The Borneo Post 2018b). The chief 
minister further insulted the urban Chinese by making the implausible 
claim that the 1MDB scandal had nothing to do with Sarawak BN, by 
stating: “That one [any issue concerning Najib and Rosmah] is their prob-
lem that side, not ours” (The Borneo Post 2018c). This was blatantly untrue, 
and the voters knew it (Chin 2018c). 
Second, because Sarawak held its parliamentary and state elections 
separately, Chinese voters traditionally “split” their vote. In previous elec-
tions, the Chinese had voted for SUPP in state elections but for the oppo-
sition in parliamentary ones. They knew that most of the decisions taken 
affecting their own lives were probably decided at the state level, and 
hence it was important to be represented by SUPP. However, at the par-
liamentary level, they wanted the opposition to represent them in Kuala 
Lumpur to register their unhappiness with the anti-Chinese policies 
adopted by the UMNO-led federal government. This form of strategic 
voting became the norm from the 1990s onwards, and thus influenced the 
Chinese vote in 2018 too (Chin 1996). 
It did not help that the Chinese were already angry with Najib and 
the BN. In the 1996 state elections, they gave some seats to SUPP because 
of the “Adenan factor”; in other words, Chinese voters were relieved that, 
after 33 years, Taib was finally stepping down as chief minister. Adenan’s 
“Sarawak for Sarawakians” state nationalism came just at the right time to 
capture the political moment, and the Chinese fully took the bait.  
In the 2018 general election, this was different however. Abang Johari 
– Adenan’s successor – did not have the goodwill or the “honeymoon 
period” that Adenan had been graced with. As mentioned, some of the 
blatant lies told by SUPP and BN were too much for the Sarawak Chinese. 
They simply wanted Najib and UMNO out of power. 
In the Dayak-majority areas, the main reason why six constituencies 
fell to the PH can be explained largely by local factors. In three of the seats 
(Selangau, Lubok Antu, and Julau), the main reason was internal sabotage; 
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in particular, revenge against Dr. James Masing, the president of BN–Parti 
Raykat Sarawak (PRS).  
In Selangau and Lubok Antu, the BN–PRS incumbents were 
dropped at the last minute by Dr. Masing. In both cases, the incumbents 
immediately activated their electoral machinery (which was ready to go 
anyway, to support their candidature) and supported the strongest oppo-
sition candidate. In Selangau, the strongest opponent was Sarawak PKR’s 
leader, Baru Bain. In Lubok Antu, meanwhile, the strongest opponent was 
Jugah Muyang, standing as an independent – although in reality he was a 
PKR member.  
In Julau, the BN–PRS candidate, Joseph Sallang, faced a revolt as well. 
PRS members unhappy with Dr. Masing were able to dislodge him be-
cause Sallang’s main challenger was Larry Sng Wei Shien, an independent. 
Larry was no ordinary independent; he was a state assemblyman for 
Pelagus, situated next door to Julau. Larry’s father, Sng Chee Hua, used to 
be the MP for Julau in the 1990s. The Sng family are wealthy, and thus 
could match any vote-buying undertaken by the official BN–PRS candi-
date. Sng Chee Hua had plenty of reasons to take revenge on Dr. Masing 
– he was the latter’s deputy in BN–PRS before falling out of favour. Larry 
also benefited from an unofficial agreement that he would face Sallang in 
a straight fight, where thus there would be no PH candidates or independ-
ents. It is certain that Sng was in touch with the PH leadership and other 
Dr. Masing critics to ensure that his son faced Sallang in a straight fight. 
The close links between Sng and PH were confirmed when Larry Sng im-
mediately joined PKR after the election, and was voted into the PKR Cen-
tral Leadership Council (Free Malaysia Today 2018a). 
In the other three seats that Sarawak BN lost (Puncak Borneo, Mas 
Gading, and Saratok), the candidate factor and internal sabotage were im-
portant contributors. In Puncak Borneo, the successful opposition PKR 
candidate, Willie Mongin, was well known in the constituency. He had 
previously stood (and lost) in the 2011, 2013, and 2016 elections. Thus by 
2018, it was his fourth attempt at office. The Sarawak BN candidate, Jean-
noth Sinel, was also heavily damaged by reports a few days before polling 
that he had acquire native land that was supposed to be communal, imply-
ing that he had “stolen” his own people’s land (The Borneo Post 2018d). 
In Mas Gading, it was also largely the same situation. The successful 
DAP candidate, Mordi Bimol, had stood before in the 2013 parliamentary 
election but lost due to multiple candidates running. In 2018, however, he 
faced a straight fight with the Sarawak BN–Progressive Democratic 
Party’s (PDP) incumbent, Anthony Nogeh Gumbek. Mordi also had the 
support of Patrick anak Uren, the former MP for the area. In both Puncak 
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Borneo and Mas Gading, the majority voters were from the Bidayuh com-
munity. 
In the Saratok constituency, the story was slight different. The BN–
PDP was weak there because the incumbent MP William Mawan anak 
Ikom had left the party and now claimed to be an independent. The PKR 
candidate, Ali Biju, was the incumbent state assemblyman for the area; he 
had lost the Saratok parliamentary seat narrowly in 2013 (Free Malaysia 
Today 2018b). Hence Ali Biju was already the front runner prior to the 
election. His BN–PDP opponent was an unknown quantity in comparison. 
In both Mas Gading and Saratok, there was a quiet revolt within PDP. 
There were some PDP members who were unhappy with the party presi-
dent, especially when he pushed for the party to go national. Previously, 
the party was called the Sarawak Progressive Democratic Party (SPDP) – 
before the word Sarawak was eventually dropped, so that the party could 
expand beyond Sarawak. Many members did not agree with this step being 
taken (Malay Mail 2018). 
Another important factor in the Dayak-majority areas was the intro-
duction of the goods and services tax (GST). The GST had actually led to 
an increase in the cost of living, despite earlier promises by the BN that it 
would lead to cheaper prices. The rural Dayak-majority areas were espe-
cially sensitive to the price increases experienced.  
3RVW(OHFWLRQ&ROODSVHRIWKH%1LQ6DEDKDQG
6DUDZDN
When it became clear that Sabah BN had lost its mandate in Sabah and 
the federal BN lost Putrajaya, the Sabah BN parties began to abandon the 
mothership. The first to leave the BN was UPKO, doing so on election 
night (9 May). UPKO announced that it was joining up with the PWS–
Sabah PH alliance to form the next state government, giving it a clear ma-
jority. On 11 May, the Chinese-based LDP announced that it was leaving 
the BN. A day later, on 12 May, the KDM-based PBRS and PBS an-
nounced that it would leave the BN as well.  
Sabah UMNO, the strongest party before the election, suddenly be-
came the weakest one when its leader Musa Aman left abruptly for Lon-
don. The day before, on 10 May, Musa Aman had forced the Sabah gov-
ernor to appoint him as chief minister. Musa claimed to have a majority 
since the two GS–STAR assemblymen would support him. A day later, 
the governor filed a police report alleging that Musa had “intimidated” 
him and forced him into holding the swearing-in ceremony (Malaysiakini 
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2018a). Two days later, Shafie Apdal was sworn in as chief minister instead, 
and heralded in the new PWS–PH administration.12 
In neighbouring Sarawak, events were less dramatic. Although Sara-
wak BN was still in power at the state level, the change at the federal one 
gave an unmistakable signal that the electorate was capable of throwing 
out the incumbent. Unlike in Sabah, the four parties within Sarawak BN 
remained intact – and, moreover, Sarawak BN was still the state govern-
ment. As mentioned, Sarawak holds its state elections separately and Sa-
rawak BN had won a landslide victory in the 2016 ones.  
Taib Mahmud, the real power behind Parti Pesaka Bumiputera Ber-
satu (PBB), flew to Kuala Lumpur to meet up with Mahathir the day after 
the results were announced. Taib tried to get Mahathir to accommodate 
Sarawak BN within the PH coalition, but Mahathir refused to commit 
himself to this (The Star 2018b). With no other political choice, Chief Min-
ister Abang Johari announced that Sarawak BN would leave BN and re-
brand itself as the earlier-mentioned GPS. This coalition would only ac-
cept into its ranks Sarawak-based parties, and would pursue a “Sarawak 
First” policy. The number one priority for GPS was to reclaim the rights 
set out in MA63 (The Borneo Post 2018e). The strategy here was to entice all 
Sarawak-based parties into a single GPS and face the PH at the next state 
election, due in 2021. 
GPS’s duplicity on MA63 could not hide the fact that it was Sarawak 
BN, and then the same people again in GPS – meaning those who had 
allowed the federal government to take over all of Sarawak’s rights for the 
past half-century. In fact for 33 years Sarawak was under the strongman 
rule of Taib Mahmud, and he was a strong political ally of Mahathir. If the 
latter had centralised too much power in the federal government, then on 
the Sarawak side Taib Mahmud did not resist – and certainly never men-
tioned anything about MA63 (Hazis 2012).   
&RQFOXVLRQ
In Sabah, the fall of the Sabah UMNO-led BN was due to the rise of PWS. 
Shafie Apdal and Darrell Leiking understood instinctively that it would 
take a Sabah-based party to dislodge Sabah BN. Their strategy of not join-
ing PH but merely entering into an alliance with it instead was the correct 
one given the strong sense of state nationalism prevailing there. They were 
helped by the unpopularity of Sabah UMNO and the BN KDM-based 

12  Musa Aman went to court claiming that he was the rightful chief minister, but 
ultimately lost the case. See the Straits Times (2018). 
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parties, seen by the younger KDM population as out of touch, tired, and 
not defending the rights of non-Muslims. The Chinese were already lean-
ing towards the opposition, too. 
In Sarawak, other than in the urban Chinese constituencies, Sarawak 
BN suffered from hubris and overconfidence. They expected the old for-
mula of vote-buying and patronage distributed among the Dayak popula-
tion to work, as it had done countless times before in previous polls. I 
have detailed in this paper how the Dayak-majority seats won by PH were 
attained mainly due to specifically local factors: primarily, due to unhappi-
ness with the selection of candidates and to internal sabotage. 
The most important outcome of GE14 is that now both of the East 
Malaysian states are not politically in sync with the federal PH government. 
PWS is at best an ally, while GPS sees PH as its likely main competitor in 
the next state election, due to be held in 2021. The last time this happened 
was in the 1960s, during the first decade of the Malaysian federation’s ex-
istence. 
Going forward, the issues of state nationalism and MA63-related au-
tonomy will now be permanent features of politics in both of these states. 
All the major parties in Sabah and Sarawak, including the PH ones in both 
states, claim to be state champions pushing back against the federal gov-
ernment. What this means for federal–state relations in Malaysia remains 
unclear, as the federal government never had to confront such a strong 
sense of state nationalism in Sabah and Sarawak simultaneously. As these 
two states pursue more autonomy in line with what the local population 
wants, this process may lead in future to a complete new configuration of 
federal–state relations in Malaysia. What is certain, however, is that the 
days of direct federation intervention in both states are over (Chin 1997b). 
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